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LIFE AND DEATH LAWYERING:
DIGNITY IN THE ABSENCE OF AUTONOMY
Teresa Stanton Collett*

I.

INTRODUCTION

While practicing law on a daily basis, I represented a hospital seeking authority to give a blood transfusion to a baby over the objection of
his Jehovah Witness parents. The hospital called late one evening, and
asked if we could get an order immediately. The treating physician
assured me that death was inevitable without the transfusion, and estimated the child's chance of survival as one in five with the transfusion.
Without a moment of hesitation I replied, "Start setting up the equipment. We'll have the order before you're ready to go." I called the local
district attorney's office. One of the lawyers there began to prepare the
petition and order for the judge's signature. The judge was contacted at
home, and agreed to sign the order as soon as it was delivered to his
house. Start to finish, initial client request to final order, the process took
less than an hour, and I made good on my promise that we would have
the order before the doctor was ready to start the blood transfusion.
Swift justice if there ever was, right? Well, it certainly was swift,
but whether it was justice continues to trouble me today. The baby did
not survive, even with the transfusion. And while I am entirely confident
that the child is not in hell because some lawyers and doctors decided to
force foreign blood into his veins,' I am equally confident that we
* Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. Visiting Professor of Law, Notre Dame
Law School. I am greatful for the encouragement of Professors Monroe Freedman and Thomas
Shaffer as I struggle to articulate the differences between autonomy and human dignity. My research
assistants, Kathryn Elias and Kathryn Weston-Overbey, have greatly improved my footnotes by their
diligent efforts.
1. Cf.Safeguarding Your Children from Misuse of Blood, OUR KINGDOM MINISTRY 3 (SEtT.
1992) reprinted in FAMtLY CARE AND MEDICAL MANAGEMENT FOR JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES at 35
(1992)). Biblical passages often used in support of the refusal to consent to blood transfusion include
Genesis 9:3-4 ("[n]ow you can eat them, as well as green plants; I give them all to you for food. The
one thing you must not eat is blood still in it; I forbid this because the life is in the blood"); Leviticus
17:14 ("[t]he life of every living thing is in the blood, and that is why the Lord has told the people of
Israel that they shall not eat any meat with blood still in it, and that anyone who does will no longer
be considered one of his people"); Deuteronomy 12:23-25 ("[o]nly do not eat meat with blood still in
it, for the life is in the blood, and you must not eat the life with the meat. Do not use the blood for
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caused untold pain to the baby's parents, who had agonizingly decided
that their baby's eternal life was more important than his temporal
existence.
This experience led me to explore the lawyer's obligations in the
factual circumstances that act as hypothetical fact patterns for this essay.
These hypotheticals reveal the weaknesses in the liberal foundation of
the "standard conception" of the lawyer's role.2 The "ideals" of partisanship and nonaccountability embodied in that conception become incoherent when used to justify advocacy of an outcome chosen by the
lawyer, and a mockery of morality when the lawyer seeks an outcome
contrary to the client's expressed desires. The discord between the intentions and results of these ideals is due in large part to the implicit "conception" of the client as autonomous rights-bearing individual.' Such an
understanding of clients is patently false when applied to children or disabled adults, and is dangerously incomplete when dealing with adults
deemed legally competent.
In this essay I suggest that legal ethics would be more consistent
with the reality of day-to-day practice, and provide greater guidance in
the dilemmas that do arise, if the current understanding of clients as
autonomous rights-bearers is replaced by an understanding which recognizes the intrinsic dignity of each person, deriving not from their capacity
to reason and be autonomous, but rather from their innate capacity to
seek, know, and move toward the objective good.

food; instead pour it out on the ground like water. If you obey this command, the Lord will be
pleased, and all will go well for you and your descendants"); and Acts 15:28-29 ("[t]he Holy Spirit
and we have agreed not to put any other burden on you besides these necessary rules: eat no food
that has been offered to the idols; eat no blood... You will do well if you take not to do these
things...").
2. One of the best descriptions of the "standard conception" of the lawyer's role is provided
by Murray L. Schwartz in The Professionalismand Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REv. 669,
673 (1978). Devotion to partisanship and nonaccountability, the two ideals identified by Professor
Schwartz, were dubbed the "standard conception" by Gerald J. Postema in Moral Responsibility in
Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 63, 73 (1980). Some scholars have argued that there is no
standard conception of a lawyer's role or that the standard conception does not guide lawyers
decision making in the day-to-day practice of law. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's
Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1529, 1532-37.
3. The limitations of this understanding of human nature in crafting effective rules of law are
explored by Professor Mary Ann Glendon, in RIGHTS TALK: Tm IMPovEaISHMEr OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE (1991).
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II.

CASES AND ISSUES TO CONSIDER

Consider the following hypothetical cases:
Baby John's Case - Judge Wise calls and asks you to accept an
appointment to represent John, the infant son of Jehovah Witnesses.
Last week, John was admitted to the hospital as a "blue child." A "blue
child" is a child who has suffered extensive oxygen deprivation resulting
in a bluish tinge around the mouth and on the nail beds, with clubbing of
the fingers and toes.4
Upon examination the doctors determined that John's heart was
enlarged on the right side, and that on the left side was a moderately loud
murmur that occurred during contraction of the heart, resulting in uneven
blood flow. The doctors have tried treating him without blood transfusions, but are now convinced that transfusions are necessary. The healthcare providers (or government authorities, if that is the proper local
procedure) have initiated a proceeding to obtain a judicial order allowing
the transfusions. There is no order appointing a guardian ad litem, and
the court wants to appoint you as "attorney for the child" (whatever that
means).
The judge tells you that the pleadings reflect that John's parents
want their son to live, but not by way of offending God. The doctors are
taking the position that the blood transfusion is medically necessary.
Will you accept the appointment, and if so, what are the objectives of
Baby John's representation? 5
Beth's Case - Mr. and Mrs. Smith have asked you to represent their
fourteen-year-old daughter, Beth.6 She is mildly retarded, with the rea4. This medical condition was suffered by the infant in State v. Perricone, 181 A.2d 751 (N.J.
1962). The Court described the child's condition as "blue around the lips and on the nail beds, both
on fingers and toes, and who showed clubbing of the fingers and the toes, which is evidence of
chronic oxygen lack." Id. at 753.
5. Model Rule 1.2 provides that the client is to determine the objectives of the representation.
However Rule 1.14 recognizes that the lawyer may be called upon to represent a client whose
"ability to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the representation is
impaired .. " The rule authorizes the attorney to seek the appointment of a guardian or "take other
protective action with respect to a client." MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.2 and
1.14 (1994).
6. Since Beth is incapable of contracting for legal services, such an agreement is not
inconsistent with the Model Rules. However, Rule 1.8(0 recognizes the propriety of accepting
payment from a third party only where the client consents, and loyalty to the client and
confidentiality are maintained. Id. Rule 1.8.
EC 7-12 of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility stated that "[a]ny mental or
physical condition of a client that renders him incapable of making a considered judgment on his
own behalf casts additional responsibilities upon his lawyer. Where an incompetent is acting
through a guardian or other legal representative, his lawyer may be compelled in court proceedings
to make decisions on behalf of the client. If the client is capable of the matter in question or of
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soning ability of an eight-year-old. Four months ago Beth was raped as
she was walking home from school. There is no factual basis to suspect
the involvement of any family member. Beth became pregnant. She is
under the care of an excellent pediatric gynecologist and obstetrician.
The doctor has determined that, due to certain vascular conditions, there
is a high probability that continuing the pregnancy will result in Beth's
suffering a severe stroke, or possibly dying. The doctor has recommended terminating the pregnancy. A second opinion confirms that this
is medically indicated in order to preserve Beth's health. Beth and her
parents are orthodox Roman Catholics, and all three refuse to consent to
the abortion.7
The district attorney, at the urging of the doctors, has initiated a
medical neglect proceeding, seeking a court order to terminate the pregnancy. Will you represent Beth? As Beth's lawyer, what position will
you take in the medical neglect proceeding?
Variations on Beth's Case - Is your analysis different if Beth's
desires diverge from her parents? 8 If she articulates a desire to terminate
the pregnancy, but her parents refuse to consent? 9 If her parents want the
contributing to the advancement of his interests, regardless of whether he is legally disqualified from
performing certain acts, the lawyer should obtain from him all possible aid. If the disability of a
client and the lack of a legal representative compel the lawyer to make decisions for his client, the
lawyer should consider all circumstances then prevailing and act with care to safeguard and advance
the interest of his client. But obviously a lawyer cannot perform any act or make any decision which
the law requires his client to perform or make, either acting for himself if competent, or by a duly
constituted representative if legally incompetent."
7. This hypothetical is loosely patterned after the facts of People v. Parks, 359 N.E.2d 358
(N.Y. 1976), and recent newspaper accounts of the pregnancy of a comatose rape victim. See, e.g.,
Judy Mann, A Case of Terrible Choices, Washington Post, Jan. 31, 1996, at E15, 1996 WL 3061705.
Other cases dealing with the rape of incapacitated women include Doe by Roe v. Madison Center
Hosp., 652 N.E.2d 101 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), and In re Estate of D.W., 481 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1985) (a guardian is vested with broad authority to act in the best interest of a ward and could
consent to an abortion for her mentally retarded ward even when the abortion was not necessary to
protect the ward's life or health).
The official teachings of the Roman Catholic Church are clear that "abortion willed either as an
end or a means, is gravely contrary to the moral law." CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, P
2271 (1994). The threat to Beth's life posed by continuing the pregnancy, however, may permit the
removal of the fetus, even at a stage where the life of the child could not be sustained outside the
womb. See Stephen Schwarz, THE MORAL QUESTION OF ABORTION 167-70 (1990).
8. At least one court has suggested that the role of counsel is to always contest the relief
sought by the petitioner. In Guardianship of K.M., 816 P.2d 71 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991), the court
held that independent counsel should be appointed "to ensure a thorough adversary exploration of
the issues" arising from parents' petition to authorize sterilization of their disabled fifteen-year-old
daughter. Id. at 75
9. In re Anonymous, a minor, No. 2950752, 1996 WL 187818 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996),
involves the unusual situation where the court, hearing the petition of a minor to authorize consent to
an abortion, receives testimony from the minor's mother concerning the reason she refuses to
consent to the abortion.
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doctors to perform the abortion, but Beth wants to continue the pregnancy?' ° Will you take Beth's case, and if so, how do you prosecute it?
Ellen's Case - Mr. and Mrs. Grant and their seventeen-year-old
daughter Ellen have asked you to represent Ellen. The Grant family are
Jehovah Witnesses. Ellen suffers from leukemia, and her doctors are
insisting that she accept blood transfusions. Without transfusions, the
doctors predict that Ellen will die within a month. She and her parents
have refused to consent on the basis of their religious beliefs. Child welfare authorities have initiated child neglect proceedings in order to obtain
court approval of the transfusions.
As a part of the initial discussions between the family and doctors,
Ellen has undergone a psychiatric evaluation by a specialist in adolescent
psychology. The psychiatrist was selected by the doctors urging the
transfusions. His report states that Ellen has the maturity of an 18- to 21year old, and that, in his opinion, she has arrived at an informed decision
to reject the transfusions. He is willing to testify that Ellen's wishes
should be honored."
Will you accept Ellen's case? If so, what are your ethical obligations to Ellen?
These fact patterns illustrate the wide variance in maturity that children experience from the time of birth until legal emancipation at age
eighteen. Baby John is incapable of forming or communicating a decision concerning his treatment. Fourteen-year-old Beth is capable of
forming and communicating a decision concerning her pregnancy, but
her decision is one that the courts are likely to ignore either on the basis
that Beth's choice does not reflect mature judgment, or that her decision
is not in her best interest.' 2 Seventeen-year-old Ellen is capable of form10. Health care providers might require court approval of the abortion in order to preclude
subsequent claims by the minor based upon her refusal to give consent. Cf., Powers v. Floyd, 904
S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Ct. App.), error denied, (1995) (upholding dismissal of malpractice claim based
upon absence of minor's consent, when physician obtained mother's written consent).
On rare occasion courts have denied the petitions of guardians seeking permission to consent to
abortion on behalf of the disabled person. See D.R. v. Daughters of Miriam Center for the Aged,
589 A.2d 668 (N.J. Super. Ch. 1990). Cases representative of the courts' proclivity to declare
abortion in the best interest of the disabled person are In re Estate of D.W., 481 N.E.2d 355 (III.
App. Ct. 1985) (medical necessity not required to authorize guardian to consent to abortion) and In
re Jane A., 629 N.E.2d 1337 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (absent evidence that ward would consider fetus
as important or dispositive factor in her decision, court erred in denying guardian authority to
consent to abortion).
11. This hypothetical is based upon the facts of In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (111.1989) (holding
that a minor who possesses the requisite degree of maturity has a limited right to refuse lifesustaining medical treatment).
12. The court is likely to cast its opinion in terms of Beth's immaturity in order to bring the
decision within the constraints of constitutional law regarding a minor's ability to seek an abortion,
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ing and communicating a mature judgment concerning the transfusions
but, due to her minority, may be legally incapable of compelling the doctors to honor it.
Several courts and commentators have struggled with the role of
children's lawyers in other contexts, such as divorce proceedings or
criminal trials. 3 Regardless of the context, many of the general questions remain the same. Should lawyers be appointed in every case? If
not, what criteria should be employed to decide if a lawyer should be
appointed in any particular case? If a child is to be represented, who
selects the lawyer? Who determines the objectives of the representation?
Should the lawyer zealously pursue the objective of the child client in the
same way that he or she might pursue the objectives of an adult client?
Distinct from the general questions that arise in any case involving
the representation of children are the issues that are unique to cases
involving healthcare. Who should decide whether to accept or reject proposed medical treatments for children? Is litigation an appropriate
method of resolving disputes between healthcare providers and patients
or their families? Does the model of zealous advocacy best promote the
proper resolution of these cases? Or should it be modified where the
stakes are so high-literally life or death, salvation or healing, or the
authority and freedom of families and individuals versus the duty and
obligation of the state to protect the lives of its citizens and promote the
common good?' 4 As evidenced by these questions, the hypothetical fact
independent of her parents' decision. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992) (Our cases establish, and we reaffirm today, that a State may
require a minor seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of a parent or guardian, provided that there
is an adequate judicial bypass procedure). Id. at 899.
13. E.g., James K. Genden, Separate Legal Representation for Children; Protecting the
Rights and Interests of Minors in Judicial Proceedings, I1 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 565 (1976);
Martin Guggenheim, The Right to be Represented But Not Heard: Reflections on Legal
Representation of Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rlv. 76 (1984); Jonathan 0. Hafen, Children's Rights
and Legal Representation-The Proper Roles of Children, Parents, and Attorneys, 7 NOTRE DAME
J.L. Emics & PuB. POL'Y 423 (1993); and Sarah H. Ramsey, Representation of the Child in
Protection Proceedings: The Determination of Decision-Making Capacity, 17 FAM. L.Q. 287
(1983). The most recent and comprehensive exploration of these issues appears at Special Issue,
Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children, 64 FORDHAM L. RaV. 1281 (1996).
14. These issues and cases concerning medical decision making for children have been
discussed by several commentators. See, e.g., Robert Bennett, Allocation of Child Medical Care
Decision-Making Authority: A Suggested Interest Analysis, 62 VA. L. Rav. 285 (1976); Linda S.
Ewald, Medical Decision Making for Children: An Analysis of Competing Interests, 25 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 689 (1982); Matthew S. Feigenbaum, Minors, Medical Treatment and Interspousal
Disagreement: Should Solomon Split the Child?, 41 DEPAuL L. REv. 841 (1992); Caroline Fraser,
Suffering Children and the Christian Science Church, ATLANTIC MoNTHLY, APR.L 1995, at 105;
Joseph Goldstein, Medical Care for Children at Risk: On State Supervision of Parental Autonomy,
86 YALE L.J. 645 (1977); Eve T. Horwitz, Note, OfLove and Laetrile: Medical Decision Making in
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patterns raise fundamental questions about the nature and purpose of
human and communal life, as well as the ability of the American legal
system to resolve conflicts arising from differing answers.

Ill.

ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE STANDARD CONCEPTION OF THE
LAWYER'S ROLE

In defining the obligations of the child's lawyer in such cases, commentators have necessarily assumed answers to many of the contested
questions. Under the standard conception of lawyering, the lawyer is a
partisan advocate of the objectives of the client and not accountable for
the nature of those objectives. 5 Contemporary accounts of these ideals
are largely based upon political liberalism's understanding of the person
and the individual's relationship to the community and the state. Clients
are viewed as "free and independent selves unclaimed by ties antecedent
to choice."' 6 Acts which have value are those acts which are chosen by
the client, and value accrues to those acts by virtue of being chosen
rather than any inherent moral quality to the act. A conception of lawyering built upon this understanding of the person necessarily venerates
the lawyer's role in facilitating the client's choice rather than the object
or effect of that choice.
This is consistent with political liberalism's commitment to neutrality among competing conceptions of the good life. 7 If no particular conception of the good life is to be favored by the state, then the individual
ultimately reigns supreme in defining the goals and purposes of his or her
life. This sovereignty is due in large part to the confidence of Enlightenment philosophers that reason would guide the individual to choices that
would simultaneously benefit both the individual and the larger commua Child's Best Interests, 5 AM. J.L. & MED. 271 (1979); Katherine A. Miller, Comment, CourtOrdered Medical Treatment for Minors: An Alternative Approach to Protect the Child's Best
Interests, 7 WHITTIER L. REV. 827 (1985); Laura M. Plastine, Comment, "In God We Trust" When
Parents Refuse Medical Treatment for the Children Based Upon Their Sincere Religious Beliefs, 3
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 123 (1993); G. Emmett Raitt, Jr., Note, The Minor's Right to Consent to
Medical Treatment: A Corollary of the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 48 S.CAL. L. REV. 1417
(1975); and Eric Treene, Prayer-Treatment Exemptions to Child Abuse and Neglect Statutes,
Manslaughter Prosecutions, and Due Process of Law, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 135 (1993).
15. Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV.
669, 673 (1978) and Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 63, 73 (1980).
16. Michael Sandel, Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?, in ARTICLES OF FAITH,
ARTICLES OF PEACE 76 (James Davidson Hunter and Os Guinness eds., 1990), quoted in Kenneth L.
Grasso, Introduction: Catholic Social Thought and the Quest for an American Public Philosophy, in
CATHOLICISM, LIBERALISM, & COMMUNITARIANISM 2 (Kenneth L. Grasso et al. eds., 1995). See also
Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEx. L. REV. 963 (1987).
17. See Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REV. 479, 502-504 (1989).
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nity. Thus "enlightened self-interest" ultimately would promote the
common good, without use of the coercive power of the state.
In cases where the nature of the common good was contested and
had to be defined in order to pursue a particular path of common effort,
public dialogue and the rational process1 8 of argument and disputation
would lead to a recognizable "solution."
Thus autonomy, neutrality, and rationality are the foundational
premises upon which the standard conception of the lawyer's role is
built. Yet cases involving medical treatment of children challenge each
of these premises.
IV.

RESOLUTION OF THE CASES UNDER THE STANDARD CONCEPTION

If liberalism's professed neutrality on questions of the ultimate purpose of human life is taken seriously, it is impossible for the lawyer to
evaluate the competing visions of "good for the child."' 9 There is no
presumptive Good by which to measure the proposed decision of the
parents, child, or healthcare providers. Under the standard conception of
the attorney's role, this neutrality effectively precludes the lawyer from
taking any position in Baby John's case since the client is unable to communicate even the most rudimentary values to guide the attorney's advocacy. 2 ° In the cases of Beth and Ellen, the attorney may surmount
liberalism's agnosticism by relying upon the clients' expressions of
desires.
18. Id. at 499-502
19. This is true, even according to one of the most successful revisionists of the standard
conception. "This [problem in justifying paternalism] is the axiom of liberal society which (in the
excellent characterization of Ronald Dworkin) 'supposes that political decisions must be, so far as is
possible, independent of any particular conception of the good life, or of what gives value to life."'
David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 454, 464 (quoting Ronald
Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MoRALITY 113, 127 (Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978)).
20. This is equally true for the court, yet courts routinely assert that the decisions they render
in such cases are based upon the best interests of the child. Until the mid-1900's, courts were not so
reluctant to recognize a religious commitment underlying our system of government. See, e.g., State
for Use And Benefit of Town of Pryor v. Williamson, 347 P.2d 204, 206 (Okla. 1959) (permitting
chapel on state-owned property); Paramount-Richards Theatres v. City of Hattiesburg, 49 So. 2d
574, 577-78 (Miss. 1950) (upholding Sunday-closing laws); Doremus v. Board of Education of
Borough of Hawthorne, 71 A.2d 732 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.), affd, 75 A.2d 880 (N.J. 1950),
appeal dismissed, 342 U.S. 429 (1952) (upholding Bible reading and prayer in public schools); and
Mordecai F. Ham Evangelistic Ass'n v. Matthews, 189 S.W.2d 524 (Ky. Ct. App. 1945) (rejecting
church's claim of exemption from taxation).
Professor Robert Rodes, Jr., expresses skepticism as to the current claims of neutrality after
thoughtful analysis of the opinions rendered in several types of cases, including cases involving
blood transfusions administered to Jehovah Witnesses, in Sub Deo et Lege: A Study of Free
Exercise, in REaLION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER (Donald A. Giannella ed., 1968).
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Yet for many lawyers the principle of nonaccountability will not
silence the accusations whispered by their consciences should they effectively advocate a course of action that results in the avoidable death or
eternal condemnation of a child. If the attorney adheres to the standard
conception, to the extent that such whisperings are silenced, it will be by
recourse to the liberal ideal of personal autonomy. This is the primary
aspect of the client to be served by legal representation according to the
standard conception. 2 ' Professor Monroe Freedman suggests that the
lawyer serves client autonomy because of the coercive nature of the
law.22 Adopting the criminal prosecution as his primary paradigm, Professor Freedman argues that the individual is morally entitled to have at
least a single ally in seeking to avoid being subjected to another's will
(be it the state or a private litigant).2 3 Professor Stephen Pepper argues
that equality of individuals is the foundation for the standard conception.
Lawyers ensure that clients have effective access to the public good of
the law in order to exercise autonomy (or free will) in whatever manner
the clients choose within the bounds of the law. Any limitations on this
access would necessarily relegate those deprived of access to secondclass citizenship.2 4 Professor Fried argues that autonomy is the primary
21. E.g., Monroe Freedman, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 57 (1990); Monroe
Freedman, Legal Ethics and the Suffering Client, 36 CAT-. U. L. REv. 331 (1987); Charles Fried,
The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundationsof the Lawyer Client Relationship, 85 YALE L. J.
1060 (1976); and Stephen Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem and
Some Possibilities, 1986 A.B.F. RES. J. 613.
22. MONROE FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 47-48 (1990) (disagreeing with
Fried's friendship model set forth in Lawyer as Friendbut agreeing with Fried's essential point that
"human autonomy is a fundamental moral concept that must determine, in substantial part, the
answers that we give to some of the most difficult issues regarding the lawyer's work." Id. at 48. In
the civil context, he suggests that all legal counseling is done in anticipation of future litigation.
"[Any lawyer who counsels a client, negotiates on a client's behalf, or drafts a legal document for a
client must do so with an actual or potential adversary in mind." Id. at 66. This understanding of
the nature of law is fully described and defended in HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND
STATE (1946).
23. FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 16 (1991) ("Mhe lawyer is the client's 'champion against a
hostile world' [C]- the client's zealous advocate against the government itself."); But see, Teresa
Stanton Collett, UnderstandingFreedman'sEthics, 33 ARIz. L. REV. 455, 456 (1991) (suggesting
that Freedman misunderstands the role of the lawyer. "The role of the lawyer is not to "win" the
unwinnable case, nor to legally extort more for the client than the client is entitled to under the law.
The role of the lawyer is to voice the client's perspective artfully and persuasively so that a just
resolution can be reached. Few clients intentionally act in a totally irrational or unjustifiable
manner. The client's motivation, intent, circumstances and desires provide the tools that a lawyer
uses in representation. The lawyer's job is to make the others involved in the matter understand the
client's perspective and vicariously share the client's pain or dilemma. Once the decisionmakers
understand the perspectives of all involved, the law and the parties can 'do justice.' Absent this
understanding, any justice achieved is merely a happy coincidence.")
24. Pepper, supra note 21, at 615-17.
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characteristic of the client because it is through choosing and ascribing
value that the person evidences his or her unique identity as a moral
25
actor.
The inadequacy of this understanding of the client is illustrated by
its application to the hypothetical fact patterns. Ellen's case fits most
easily into the standard conception. Representation of Ellen is no more
troubling than representation an adult Jehovah Witness seeking to avoid
unwanted medical care. This is true because the standard conception of
the lawyer's role admits two primary limitations upon the objectives a
26
client may seek. First, the client's objectives must be within the law,
and second, the objectives should represent the client's "adequately considered decision."2 7 Ellen's objective is not precluded by the law since
there is no legal duty to seek medical treatment. Nor does her objective
violate the second limitation which contains a presumption of rationality
or reasonableness. In Ellen's case, the report of the examining psychiatrist provides support for the application of that presumption, at least if
"adequately considered" is defined in terms of the process of decision
28
making, rather than the ultimate decision reached.
Beth presents a more difficult case for the standard conception
because, while her chronological age of fourteen might support application of the presumption of rationality and thus autonomy, her mental age
of eight makes such an assumption less certain. This is further complicated by the fact that the medical procedure at issue has a constitutional
gloss absent from the blood transfusions involved in Baby John and
Ellen's cases. The professional norms governing lawyers suggest that
the lawyer should defer when the client "has the ability to understand,
deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting the client's own well-being."29 However the required degree of understand25. Fried, supra note 21, at 1068-69 ("We must attain and maintain in our morality a concept
of personality such that it makes sense to posit choosing, valuing entities-free, moral beings.")
26. MODEL RuLEs oF PROESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.2(d) (1994).
27. Id. Rule 1.14.
28. This process oriented measure of mental capacity contains the same implicit assumption
that only the individual should determine the ends he seeks, and, thus, it is improper to evaluate
capacity on the basis of the decisions made rather than decision making. See generally President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment (1983); Susan M. Denbe, Termination of
ife-Sustaining Medical Treatment: Who Should Exercise a Patient's Right to Die?, 12 HEALTH
CARE SuPER. 60 (1994); Daniel B. Griffith, The Best Interests Standards: A Comparison of the
State's Parens Patriae Authority and Judicial Oversight in Best Interests Determinationsfor
Children and Incompetent Patients, 7 Issuas L. & MED. 283 (1991); and Allen C. Snyder,
Competency to Refuse Lifesaving Treatment: Valuing the Non-logical Aspects of a Person's
Decisions, 10 IssuEs L. & MED. 299 (1994).
29. MODEL RuLEs oF' PRoresSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14 cmt. (1994).
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ing and deliberation is not specified. In individual cases, the lawyer is
left to determine whether respect for the client's decisions, and thus
autonomy, should dictate the objectives of the representation.
In Baby John's case, his incapacity to reason or communicate precludes recourse to the standard conception. The lawyer, receiving no
information from the client concerning the client's objectives, can not
justify seeking particular ends on the basis that those ends are the reasoned choice of the client. Rather, the ends sought will reflect ends prescribed by the court, the lawyer, or the child's family.
If prescribed by the court, the lawyer's moral justification probably
will be grounded in some concept of procedural justice. This justification may require the attorney to oppose the relief sought by the petitioner
in order to "insure a thorough adversary exploration of the issues. 3 °
Many courts and commentators equate procedural justice with the
adversary system. Proponents argue that the adversary presentation of
evidence maximizes the chances that the truth will be arrived at by the
fact finder,3 ' and promotes the protection of legal rights.32 Neither of
these arguments provides much insight into resolving cases involving the
medical treatment of children.
In the hypothetical cases (as in many similar reported cases), the
truth of the "facts" is not the heart of the controversy. When medical
opinion divides over the proper treatment, or when recognized healthcare
providers are willing to provide alternative, and non-controversial treatments, transferring care of the patient to the providers who offers treatment consistent with the patient's (or family's) desires is the easiest and
most appropriate resolution of the conflict. Only when healthcare providers are unified in their recommendations, and the patient (and/or family) declines to act on those recommendations, do the courts typically
become involved.3 3 Yet in these cases, the issue the court is called to
30. Guardianship of K.M., 816 P.2d 71, 75 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
31. Lon Fuller and John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint
Conference of the ABA-AALS, 44 ABA J. 1159-62 (1958).
32. FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 3-4.
33. Cf. Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108 (Del. Super. Ct. 1991) (Upholding parents'
rejection of chemotherapy in favor of prayer treatment where survival was not assured even with
medical intervention.); In re Eric B., 235 Cal Rptr. 22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (Requiring medical
monitoring of child following court-ordered chemotherapy treatments over renewed parental
objections); In re Green, 292 A.2d 387 (Pa. 1972) (Dismissing court ordered medical intervention
for seventeen-year-old poliomyelitis patient suffering from 94% curvature of the spine on basis that
condition is not considered life-threatening); and In re Baby K, 832 F.Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993),
afftd, 16 F.3d. 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 91(1994) (Rejecting petition by hospital and

natural father to remove anacephalic child from life support over mother's objection). See also Gina
Kolata, Battle over a Baby's Future Raises Hard Ethical Issues, NY TisMFS, Dec. 27, 1994, at A1,
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resolve is the very issue that the current understanding of liberalism professes to be off-limits-what Good should the individual seek.
In all of our hypothetical cases, the healthcare providers assert that
the good to be sought on behalf of the child is restoration of health or
preservation of life.34 The intrinsic value of this goal is not disputed by
the parents or the child. In fact, the courts routinely acknowledge that
35
this good is desired by the parents as well as the healthcare providers.
The point of dispute is whether the good of health or preservation of life
can be pursued by means that the child (or parents) believe offend God,
or are objectively evil. The child or parents argue that the good of health
is secondary to the good of obeying God or avoiding evil.
Just as the facts are not the heart of the controversy, neither does the
adversarial norm of competing "legal rights" neatly fit these cases,
although the courts often discuss the issues in terms of the legal right of
36
parents to direct the care and upbringing of their children. In such disand Michelle 0. Ray, Defying DeathSentence, Baby Ryan Heads Home, NEws TRiB., Mar. 6, 1995,
at Al (News reports of successful effort by parents of premature handicapped infant to enjoin
hospital from discontinuing dialysis without their consent).
34. Maine Medical Center v. Houle, Superior Court, No. 74-145 (Me. Super. Ct. February 14,
1974) reprinted in HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 11781180 (3d Ed. 1990) ("The most basic right enjoyed by every human being is the right to life itself.")
Compare Aristotle, NICOMACHEAN ETHics 1.6: 1097A15-23 (Jonathan Barnes ed. 1985) (health is a
good sought by all men), and JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 86 (1980) ("A first
basic value, corresponding to the drive for self-preservation, is the value of life. The term 'life' here
signifies every aspect of the vitality (vita, life) which puts a human being in good shape for selfdetermination. Hence, life here includes bodily (including cerebral) health, and freedom from pain
that betokens organic malfunctioning or injury.").
35. E.g. State v. Perricone, 181 A.2d 751 at 759 (N.J., 1962) ("Respondent concedes that
appellants evidenced sincere parental concern and affection for their child. But those are not the
controlling factors."); Robert Stinson and Peggy Stinson, On the Death of a Baby, ATLANTlc
MONTHLY, July 1979 at 64 (Parents' account of personal, family, and financial impact of prolonged
death of premature infant due to heroic measures and experimental techniques undertaken by
hospital without parents' consent.); Cf Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("[Historically it
has been recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act on the best interests of their
children." (Emphasis added)).
36. Cf. Parham, 442 U.S. 584 (holding that parents may commit children for residential
psychiatric care); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S.
510 (1925) (upholding injunction against compulsory attendance at public schools on basis of
parental right to direct the upbringing and education of their children.); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that Amish parents who refuse to send children to formal high school are
not in violation of compulsory attendance statute since they provide alternative education that would
adequately prepare children for life within their community); and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944) (affirming conviction of Jehovah's Witness under a statute forbidding minors from
selling newspapers as not in violation of "freedom of religion" or denying "equal protection").
Compare Bruce C. Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law: the Waning of Belonging,
1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. I with James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking
the Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 CALIF. L. REv. 1371 (1994) (arguing that parents' have no moral
right to exercise control over children, but merely privilege to exercise control consistent with
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putes, what "legal right" of the child should the lawyer seek to protect?
Children have an interest in the continuation of life37 and the avoidance
of pain.3 8 They have an interest in having their parents make the decisions on matters that require the most extensive and intimate knowledge
of the child.3 9 For children of sufficient maturity, there is an interest in
having their views heard and respected by those in authority, '0 as well as
a claim of free exercise of religion by children who have embraced a
religious faith as their own.4 Each of these interests should weigh heavily in the balance of judgment concerning the child's welfare, yet which
constitutes the "legal right" to be protected by the child's lawyer?
Related, yet distinct, from the argument that legal representation
promotes and protects the legal rights of the client, is the argument that
adversarial representation evidences society's commitment to human
dignity.4 2 By presenting the client's position with the greatest zeal possible, the lawyer ensures that the client's actions or desires are presented as
positively or persuasively as possible to the decision maker. Thus society evidences its willingness to take seriously all of those who come
before the courts.43
This is the most persuasive justification offered for the adversary
system. However, it fails in the context of the hypothetical cases if the
lawyer advocates any position other than one established by the child
client. If the lawyer opposes the relief sought by the petitioner because
communal understanding of the child's best interest); with Melinda A. Roberts,

PARENT AND CHILD

& PUB. POL'Y
485 (1996) (suggesting that current constitutional jurisprudence recognizing parents' interest in
fulfilling their responsibilities should be replaced by judicial recognition of decisions by children
involving their fundamental rights when those decisions are consistent with their long-term best
interest).
37. See Maine Medical Center, No. 74-145 at 1178-1180 ("[tlhe most basic right enjoyed by
every human being is the right to life itself.").
38. Kathryn D. Perkins discusses recent cases of children, usually teenagers, who refused
continuing medical treatment due to the pain involved in Kids' Rights in Medical Treatment
Debated, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 29, 1995 at Al.
39. Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108 (Del. Super. Ct., 1991). Cf. Parham, 442 U.S. 584
(holding that parents may commit children for residential psychiatric care). See Bruce C. Hafen,
Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law: the Waning of Belonging, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1.
40. In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d 286 (Il1. App. Ct. 1987) (seventeen year-old Jehovah Witness
should have been partially emancipated to permit her to refuse blood transfusion); In re Green, 292
a.2d 387 (Pa. 1972) (requiring trial court to consider views of sixteen-year-old regarding proposed
surgery).
41. Id. See also Novak v. Cobb County-Kennestone Hospital Authority, 849 F.Supp. 1559,
1571, 1574-75 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (sixteen year-old Jehovah Witness patient's right to free exercise of
religion was not violated by court ordered transfusion).
42. FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 13.
43. Id. at 65. This position is critiqued by David Luban in LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN
ETHICAL STUDY 85-87 (1988).
IN CONFLICT: BETWEEN LIBERTY AND RESPONSIBILITY, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
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that is the role the court assigns, the lawyer may provide the testing of
evidence and argument desired by the decision maker, but that is not the
same as evidencing respect for the views of the person represented. If
the lawyer advocates his or her own view of what is in the best interest of
the child client, the lawyer may provide the court greater insight into the
facts surrounding the controversy, but this also differs from promoting
the dignity of the child." Only by limiting legal representation to representation of the views or desires of the child, does the attorney provide
the affirmation that society takes seriously the claims of even its youngest members, regardless of whether those members are sufficiently
autonomous to make the ultimate decisions in controversy.
V.

RESOLUTION BASED UPON HUMAN DIGNITY

The above discussion evidences the limitations of the standard conception when premised upon liberalism's ideals of autonomy, neutrality,
and rationality. The limitations can be avoided by reconceiving of the
lawyer's role as a partisan for the human dignity of the client, and holding lawyers accountable for ascertaining whether representation of particular objectives is consistent with that dignity. In a post-modem world,
where autonomy is seen as a unrealistic description of the decision making process; rationality is understood as an incomplete, if not false,
description of that which is essentially human; and neutrality is recognized as both impossible and often undesirable, an alternative conception
of the lawyer's role must be established. Representation based upon
human dignity provides such an alternative.
For purposes of this article, human dignity is defined as the constant
attraction and movement of people toward the Good through the use of
44. By appointing a lawyer to represent the child's best interest, the court merely expands the
number of decisionmakers. This does little to solve the essential problem which is ascertaining
whose conception of the Good should dominate. By independently determining and advocating the
lawyer's conception of the child's best interest, the lawyer interjects one more competing vision. It
seems wrong to take the vision of a total stranger to the situation and introduce it as yet another idea
that competes for control of the treatment of the child.
Another danger of appointing a lawyer to represent the child's best interest before a tribunal
empowered to act as parent, is the possibility that the court will abandon its responsibility to
independently assess the competing claims for control, and merely defer to the judgment of it's own
appointed agent, the child's attorney. This threatens a form of secret decisionmaking that is
antithetical to our understanding of the nature of judicial resolution of disputes, for the judgment of
the lawyer will be arrived at through his or her private investigation. Many of the facts the lawyer
relies upon in forming an opinion about the child's best interests may not be subjected to the
cleansing power of adversarial confrontation. And, in the end, while the appearance of adversarial
process remains intact, the outcome is predetermined through the guise of appointing a lawyer for
the child.
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will, intellect, spirit, and body. This concept of person assumes an external good (or goods) that is the natural object of each person.4 5 It rejects
the idea that each individual is purely a construct of his or her personal
history and choices. Instead, by embracing human dignity as the ultimate objective of client representation, we recognize that the individual
person is chosen as well as chooser; spirit as well as will, altruistic as
well as egotistic. The definition refers to "people," not person, because
the primary concern is the individual within a community, rather than the
individual alone. This is because much of our recognition of the Good
(or goods) begins within the relationships we are born into, and continues
in our communal movement toward realizing that Good in our lives.46
VI.

HUMAN DIGNITY AS A MORE INCLUSIVE DEsCRIPTION OF
THE CLIENT

Human dignity provides a more solid foundation for understanding
the nature of the client in the context of legal representation. This is true
because human dignity, while including some concept of autonomy, is a
more inclusive description of the person the lawyer is called to serve. It
provides a basis for representation of those who are not recognized as
autonomous, as well as acknowledging the placement of the individual
within relationships with others.
The need for a more inclusive conceptual foundation of the attorney-client relationship is illustrated by the inability of the autonomybased model to coherently define the lawyer's role when representing
clients lacking or having limited autonomy, such as children. The lack
or loss of autonomy should not render a person a non-entity for legal
representation. Yet, if the lawyer's paramount purpose is to facilitate the
client's exercise of autonomy, then legal representation of children truly
is problematic since many of us will readily concede that children are not
autonomous beings, at least until they attain sufficient maturity to make
decisions in a manner that reflect that those decisions are the product of
their reason and free will.
45. John M. Finnis provides a careful explanation of the natural goods that can be discerned by
practical reasonableness in FINNis, NATURAL LAW, supra note, 34. Abraham J. Heschel describes
the communal aspect of the person as solidarity. "Man in his being is derived from, attended by, and
directed to the being of community. For man to be means to be with other human beings."
ABRAHAM HESCHEL, WHO IS MAN? at 45 (1965).

46.
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Reconceiving of the lawyer's relationship with clients as affirming
the dignity of the client is central to resolving the problems facing lawyers who represent children in cases concerning life-sustaining treatment.
The case of a child rejecting medical care because of a hope of eternal
salvation or a desire to avoid evil, is not the same as the case of a child
rejecting medical care because of temporary, but intense, suffering. In
the first case the claim of moral goodness that the child seeks to express
is central to the child's human dignity. In the second case the claim of
avoidance of pain, while also a part of human experience, is not central
to defining what it is to be human and may be in direct conflict with a
primary aspect of human dignity, which is the goodness of life and its
continuation.4 7
Human dignity is an intrinsic good and innate attribute of every person. Autonomy is an instrumental good limited to individuals capable of
exercising reason. To define legal representation in terms of autonomy
rather than human dignity is to celebrate procedure over substance, or
decisionmaking over decisions. Human freedom has value to the individual and to the community in the exact proportion that it furthers the
individual and common search for the Good. For example, the free
exercise of religion should be protected, not because religion should be a
matter of indifference to the state, but rather because it is too important
to subject to the authority of the state. Similarly free speech should be
protected, not because hate speech or pornography inflict no harm, but
because the bounds of community are dependent upon communicationhonest and free communication between people. When autonomy results
in objectively evil acts, while it may be necessary to tolerate the acts to
achieve a greater good, it is absurd to suggest that any other person
(whether or not a lawyer) has a moral obligation to assist in the exercising of the freedom or autonomy that resulted in those acts. Human dignity as the premise of legal representation recognizes this fact and would
not require assistance, since representation would be premised upon the
human capacity to recognize the Good and move toward it, no matter
how haltingly.
Human dignity demands recognition of human goods other than
autonomy. One of those goods is the existence and authority of human
associations other than the state. This leads to the relational aspect of
human dignity as defined by this article. In medical treatment cases concerning children, the core issue is who will have the authority to direct
47. See Stephen Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem and Some
Possibilities, 1986 A.B.F. Res. J. 613.
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the treatment.4 8 In the cases of Baby John, Beth, and Ellen, the problem
is that we have at least three possible decisionmakers: the parents, the
child, and the doctors. The state is a fourth competing decisionmaker in
some states. At least two of these decisionmakers disagree. Because of
the level of conflict, the issues are placed before the court for resolution.
But unlike other cases resolved in civil litigation where the court simply
decides among competing claims, in medical treatment cases involving
children, the court, through common law, declares itself to be a superior
claimant as the representative of the state.
It is an aspect of human dignity that intimate associations such as
parent/child or husband/wife will be recognized and deferred to, absent
some important common interest that requires protection. This is true
because it is through such relationships that we experience our greatest
success in responding to our innate attraction toward the Good. It is in
the family that the child is brought into being, and through the family, he
or she continues to become more fully human.
The family pre-exists the State, and its members are the true and
only parents of the child. Recognition of parental authority stems from
this truth. For the state to intervene to define the child's best interests
contrary to the understanding expressed by the parents and child is to
claim a greater good than the human dignity experienced in the relationships of families. It effectively silences the parents and the child on a
matter of tremendous importance and substitutes the opinion of state.
This can only be done on a claim of common good. In order for the
lawyer to promote the dignity of the child client, the claim of common
good must be challenged and the state or healthcare providers required to
show why the good sought by the child and/or parents must give way to a
different good. This challenge is necessary in order to preserve the relational interests that all of us have in nurturing the mutual support and
dependence represented by the family and other human associations
which exist independent and prior to the political order.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In cases like those of Baby John, where the children are neither
capable of forming nor communicating decisions concerning their medical treatment, no lawyer should be appointed to represent the child.
Young children enjoy human dignity to the same degree as all people,
48. In re C.A., 603 N.E.2d 1171 (IIl.App. 1992), appeal denied 610 N.E.2d 1264 (1993) ("the
ultimate issue, them, is who is in the best position to decide (and who gets to decide who will
decide).").
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but affirmation of the dignity through legal representation is not possible.
Instead, the child's dignity is affirmed by representation of those who
bear day-to-day responsibility in the nurturing and caring for the child,
most often the parents. They can present the fullest description of the
child-not only as he or she is today, but as he or she was yesterday, and
most probably will be tomorrow. The parents in these cases have not
failed to seek care for their children, nor evidenced disregard for their
children's welfare. They have not forfeited their right to direct the treatment of their children. It is the parents who should speak for the child in
court, rather than some lawyer whose insight is limited both by time of
acquaintance and ignorance of the faith embraced by the family.
When the child is capable of expressing an opinion concerning the
proposed treatment and that opinion is grounded in some conception of
goodness, the child should be represented. Fourteen-year-old Beth
should be represented because she is capable of expressing an opinion
and seeks either to preserve her health or avoid participating in an objectively evil act. Because Beth has the reasoning ability of an eight-yearold her decision will not be the result of the mature reflection that courts
require prior to partially emancipating a child in order to allow the child
to make medical decisions. Nonetheless, Beth has formulated some
objective in furtherance of a recognized good, and will be the person
subjected to or denied treatment. This gives her a moral right to be
heard, and that right is most effectively exercised through counsel.4 9
This is true, of course, only in so far as her lawyer advocates the objectives that Beth desires. Because Beth's moral right to representation
arises from her right to be heard, rather than her right to control the
decision, the lawyer should seek the objective that Beth defines, regardless of the lawyer's assessment of Beth's decision-making ability, or his
or her opinion concerning whether Beth's objective is consistent with her
best interest.
Similarly Ellen should be represented consistent with her expressed
desires in so far as those desires arise in conjunction with her attempts to
attain goodness.
The standard conception in which the lawyer seeks to further the
autonomy of the client may yield the same result in Ellen's case. However, the outcomes of Beth's and Baby John's cases differ significantly.
Defining legal representation as serving the dignity of the client effectively precludes strangers from promoting what one author has called
49. David Luban refers to this as the "own-mistakes" principle which requires that those who
will bear the primary burden of conforming to the legal mandate be afforded the most significant
consideration during the process of decision making. LuBAN, supra note 43, at 344.
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"the right to be represented, but not heard."'5° The absence of rationality
or autonomy no longer would license lawyers to define the objectives of
representation in ignorance or disregard of their clients. Nor would nonaccountability shield lawyers from moral approbation when the ends
sought on behalf of their clients were inconsistent, with the Good (or
goods) all persons seek. Since that Good (or goods) is discerned and
achieved most fully in community, lawyers properly would be concerned
with the relationships of their clients, as well as their autonomy. This
understanding of the lawyer's role would preclude representation of
Baby John, except through representation of his parents, and require
Beth's lawyer to seek the objectives that she desires. Beth's decision
would not preclude others from contesting her conception of the Good,
nor bind the court to honor her wishes, but it would ensure that her voice
was heard.
Hearing the voice of the "other" affirms the intrinsic dignity of the
person. The unique purposes, perspective, and relationships of each person are acknowledged. Premising legal representation upon the dignity
of the client, rather than autonomy, ensures that even "the least among
us" may speak to those who would exercise power over their lives. It
allows considerations of truths, like love and faith, that find only a dim
echo in reason, yet are compelling to and worthy of the human person.
It is possible that by serving the dignity of the client, rather than the
autonomy, we may even discover that this more truthful description permits greater positive freedom for both client and lawyer. We may discover anew that "the truth shall make [us] free."'5' But this time the
freedom will be real freedom - freedom to serve our clients, our society, and the Good that we are called to seek.

50. Martin Guggenheim, The Right to be Represented But Not Heard: Reflections on Legal
Representation of Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 76 (1984).
51. John 8:32 ("And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.")

